This defence deal could've been a masterstroke. Unfortunately, it's riddled with flaws

One could, for example, use Papua New Guinea volunteers to make up the serious shortfall of numbers in our submarine service. Short of press gangs, the prospect of fresh Australian volunteers over the next 20 years is dim. The US has much the same problem.

One would start with our diesel subs, with aspiration to go nuclear (if we ever see the damn things) later. Even now, Australia struggles to have a fraction of the men and women to crew even the reduced number of submarines we can have at sea at any moment. Despite excellent pay and quite good conditions, submarine service is unpopular, particularly because of long periods at sea underwater. If we get the nuclear subs, we will need at least three times the present number to have boats continuously at sea.

In due course, our PNG allies could vie to crew on the nuclear-powered submarines we are supposedly getting from the United States under the AUKUS deal, and after that the British-Australian nuclear-powered submarines that are supposedly being built later, also under the AUKUS deal.

Some might think I am being ironical, thinking, in a somewhat racist way, that it would be impossible to recruit PNG citizens to an educational standard where they would be capable of performing the sophisticated functions on our existing submarines, let alone nuclear-powered ones. Submarine crews these days are manned by people with education and training of graduate and post-graduate or skilled tradesmen and the jobs are not for ordinary calibre cannon fodder, as some, wrongly, expect the PNG soldiers to be.

But most nations in the submarine game, and in the nuclear submarine game recruit and train men and women with the skills they need. They do not contract the skills in, or recruit already qualified nuclear engineers, sonar operators, and people with a deep understanding of weapons systems. Defence forces that need electricians, mechanics, logistics experts and cooks train themselves, and according to their own needs. If those needs develop to the point of being able to operate a nuclear-powered boat, they will be trained in it, including by those selling the boat, with practice by serving in their boats.

It is not to be supposed that the raw material of the American, or British, or even the Australian raw recruit in the submarine service is of a far higher calibre than a Papua New Guinean. Or that those co-ordinating recruitment should imagine PNG soldiers only as potential riflemen or women, trained only for bush operations. My bet is that they would match our folk for efficiency after training and beat them for enthusiasm.

Submarine services vary according to the proportion of crew with critical skills, which is sometimes a function of the average educational level of base recruits, and the length of time they can be expected to be doing service at sea.

But it cannot be said that the average Australian seeking to enter the armed services is of a very high educational standard, though, possibly, it is higher than the standard in the US. But like the Americans, ADF members become, we hope, excellent soldiers, sailors or aircrew because of the quality of the training they get, and the way that this complements good management and good leadership. The content of this training is not about rote or parade-ground skills, but must constantly develop according to technological change and the type of conflict possible.

For Australia, a national security reservation against giving highly critical jobs and skills to PNG defence forces might be the fear that PNG could accumulate a critical mass of skills that they could use against us, or, more likely, against their own constitutional government. That could be an argument for diverting people into submarine service. Submarines can help protect PNG and its territorial integrity but would be completely useless in any effort to take control of PNG infrastructure or systems of government.

The geography of PNG and the lack of long roads are such that even a conventional army (or police force) finds it difficult to control a critical mass of territory. It explains why the PNG government, though often chaotic and involving constantly changing alliances, is consensus-oriented. There are firm territorial limits on the power of even the powerful players.

Many Australians, including in the political, defence and intelligence community doubt that the nuclear-powered submarines will ever pass into Australian command and control. The US is not producing enough nuclear subs to be able to afford to sell any to allies, least of all those who will not commit to be at America's side during a war with China over Taiwan.

Almost certainly, most Australians do not want the AUKUS deal anyway. They do not trust the increasing entwinement with the US, which does not share our values, even on basic matters such as democracy. They do not want a war with China, which, whether it suits US interests, would not serve Australia's. They do not believe that Britain, a fast-fading power of decreasing connection with Australia and its interests, has the ability or the will to assist in protecting our national interests. They have let us down, repeatedly, before; they will do it again. Given the recent history of British defence projects, they do not, in any event, have any faith that Britain can produce a useful submarine for Australia (or themselves) within the next 50 years.

Twenty years from now, Australians may well figure that the politicians of today spent billions on physical defence equipment that never came, and the promise of sharing technological secrets we could never exploit. Australians are already critical of our politicians' defence thinking but they will think even less of them when it all falls apart. But in many circles, there will probably be a sense of relief, despite all the money wasted. While Australia's war hawks and intelligence establishment were shilling for a war on behalf of the US, Australia took some of its first steps towards an independent foreign policy, including in the Pacific, the Middle East, with China and India and with south-east Asia. It may be that it kept a foot in American alliances for too long, but like most of America's former neighbours it recognised that America would look, first and last, to its own interests rather than if there were a military threat to its erstwhile allies.

And what of PNG? With or without a submarine at the end of the tunnel, as it were, our neighbours and allies could have vastly increased incomes, and skills which could be put to work in their own country. Australia's own needs in PNG and the Pacific may well inspire some fresh basic investment, as a partner, in Pacific education, training, primary healthcare and infrastructure. That does not have to involve repeats of mismanagement, misgovernance and waste associated with some past aid programs, but some collective action to deal with chronic problems, including climate change.

Such action would not only be in the interests of the recipient nations, but in improving the quality of life, the standard of living of the populations and public justice and safety. It would also, incidentally, make interference by others less likely. Australian neglect of the PNG relationship over the past 40 years, has made the Australian economy astonishingly vulnerable to outbreaks of animal diseases, such as foot and mouth disease. Australia's failure to protect its own interests by assisting its neighbours from human epidemics and pandemics may well cost it far more than the piffling savings made.

But the biggest bonus could be in some reinvigoration of the relationship with a friendly neighbour, once admittedly our colony, deserving not only of our respect as an equal but with a lot to offer us. PNG has been independent for 50 years. At independence, many of its expat population drifted back to Australia; others stayed and helped. PNG had friends in court in Australia, including prime ministers who had known most of its politicians over the period up to independence. In time, the two countries have drifted apart, at both official and people-to-people levels. This was not necessarily because of significant quarrels but was partly a result of PNG's efforts to stand on its own feet without condescending advice from Australia. Respect has often been in short supply. In the meantime, Australia's attitudes to PNG have seemed preoccupied with law and order and the security of tourists and citizens, official corruption and the security of public institutions, including police, the military and economic management.

A good example of the benign neglect and lack of a sure neighbourly hand might be seen in economic co-operation, and planning. It would be interesting to poll the SES in Canberra on the population of PNG. Does anyone know, say to within a million?

The last PNG census thought fairly reliable was in 2000 when the population was estimated at 5.728 million. In a country with PNG's terrain, censuses are difficult and expensive, and it is easy, without the diligence that proper resources can bring, to miss significant populations. A 2021 census, which is not judged very reliable, put the population at 11,781,559. In 2022, a UN satellite survey estimated the population at about 17 million. The CIA factbook cites a 2024 estimate of 10,046,233. I like the way that some estimates get down to individuals.

Last year, Australian and PNG census folk began working on a program to get more accurate estimates, but I don't think any estimates or guesses have emerged yet. If Australia (or Indonesian) defence or intelligence estimates are better founded than those I have cited, they are not published. I doubt they exist. It must not be thought that PNG was the only neighbour with whom we have an information gap. But PNG is much bigger than most of its nearby neighbours. Irian Jaya has between six and 10 million (with the potential that the two parts of the island have a population about the size of Australia, increasing annually by up to 3 per cent. Fiji has about 1 million, the Solomons around 800,000, Vanuatu about 350,000 and Kiribati perhaps 140,000.

It is an extraordinary thing that we have just concluded a treaty with a former colony, neighbour and friend without any reasonable idea of how many people are embraced by the deal. It may not matter so much in economic terms, given that at least 40 per cent of the nation live by subsistence agriculture, but it matters a lot when one is calculating potentially shared burdens of healthcare, education, justice and security campaigns. It is amazing that Australian politicians are not demanding more accurate information, for our own purposes as well as in prompting PNG officials to plan more carefully.

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Like Indonesia, PNG is in the Ring of Fire. Imagine if they have a significant natural disaster, one bigger than the Mount Lamington volcano-earthquakes of 1951, which killed perhaps 3000 people. Almost all the PNG area is prone to volcano eruptions or earthquakes or both, some of the latter having magnitudes of up to 8. This includes coastal areas open to tsunamis, and populous but almost inaccessible places in the highlands. Rabaul is virtually abandoned because of earthquakes. I do not expect that Australia's approach to disaster assistance is affected much by entering a military treaty. Yet the fact of the treaty should be concentrating our minds.

Perhaps my suggestion of a Papua New Guinea submarine service should be rejected. After all, Australia is planning to base its submarines, and America's, on the other side of Australia, perhaps 4000 nautical miles, or 300 hours submersed, from the Coral Sea or the Bismarck Sea. That's a good two weeks before going on station. And two back, of course. Going underwater, Perth to Xiamen, in Fujian province China, would be a bit quicker, if with an inferior view and no possibility of opening the windows for sleeping after a shift.